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Abstract 
We experimentally investigate the impact of visibility of information about contributors 
on contributions in the public goods game. We systematically consider several treatments that 
are similar to a wide range of situations in practice. First, we vary the cost of viewing identifiable 
information about contributors. Second, we vary recognizing all, top or bottom contributors. We 
find that recognizing all contributors significantly increases contributions relative to the baseline. 
Recognizing only the top contributors is not significantly different from not recognizing 
contributors, but recognizing only the bottom contributors is as effective as recognizing all 
contributors. When viewing information about contributors is costly, there is no significant 
difference in contributions as compared to the case where all contributors are displayed by 
default. This effect holds even though the identities of contributors are viewed less than ten 
percent of the time. 
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1. Introduction 
The desire for social approval suggests that individuals will act more generously in public 
if their generosity is viewable by others. It has been acknowledged that recognizing contributors 
by revealing their identity increases contributions to public goods (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; 
Rege and Telle, 2004; Anderson et al., 2009).
1
 Charity organizations and online communities 
publicize individuals’ contributions for this reason, and very few donations are actually done 
anonymously (Glazer and Konrad, 1996). However, while information on contributors is often 
available, the visibility of such information varies. While charity organizations endeavor to 
publicize all information, this is often difficult to impossible for several reasons. First, when 
there are many donors, publicizing the names of all of them may not be feasible. In this case, 
charities often publicize the names of the largest donors, e.g., by naming a building after the 
highest donor or by publicly announcing donors in categories by size of donation (Harbaugh, 
1998; Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Li and Riyanto, 2009). Second, it is improbable that every 
member of the donor’s social network will view all of the contributor information. For example, 
in online communities, locating information about individual contributions can take time.  
While there is agreement among researchers and practitioners that recognizing 
contributors has a positive effect, a systematic investigation of the impact of visibility of 
information on donations has not been conducted. We address this question through a series of 
controlled laboratory experiments that explore the effect of information visibility on donations. 
We build our study on the design of Andreoni and Petrie (2004) by investigating a public goods 
setting with a treatment in which no identifiable information about donors is displayed and a 
                                                 
1
 Results from psychology literature also suggest that individuals may use information about others’ contributions as 
a reference point to perform social comparisons (Bazerman et al., 1992; Loewenstein et al., 1989; Berkowitz, 1972).  
It has also been found that announcing a “target contribution,” splitting contributions into levels, or allowing a 
“leader” to contribute first and set an example can increase contributions (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Rege and 
Telle, 2004; Anderson et al., 2009). 
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treatment in which photos and names of contributors are displayed. We then extend this study 
with novel treatments that address the effectiveness of several mechanisms that charities and 
online communities may employ when publicizing contributor information. The first mechanism 
is to visibly display information only about the top contributors. The second mechanism is to 
display information about all contributors in a location that is costly to access, for example 
because it takes time to do so. To pinpoint what type of information is most influential, in a 
follow-up treatment, we also investigate the impact of visibly displaying information only about 
lowest contributors. 
The first two mechanisms are similar to a wide range of situations in practice. For 
example, many charity organizations and educational institutions utilize the first mechanism by 
acknowledging top monetary donors, e.g., naming a university building after a top donor or 
naming rooms in the building after several top donors. Online communities often acknowledge 
only the top content contributors by assigning them prestigious titles such as “Mentor” or 
“Expert.” In this way, less active contributors are not publicly recognized. Organizations that 
elicit monetary contributions may recognize donors using the second mechanism by publishing 
lists on websites and in the media, but it is not clear that this information is always viewed by the 
public due to the time and effort that must be spent in order to view such information.
2
 Likewise, 
users of online communities incur a time and effort cost to view rankings of contributors. For 
example, on the popular question and answer site Yahoo! Answers, a “Leaderboard” announces 
the total number of answers provided by the contributors of the site, but this information takes 
                                                 
2
 As an example, see http://www.pharmacy.purdue.edu/advancement/publications/annual_reports/2009/donors.php 
which is a list of donors to the School of Pharmacy and Pharmaceutical Sciences at Purdue University. The report is 
difficult to locate online, and the list of donors takes substantial time to read through. 
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time and effort to view.
3
 Similar ranking information is available on the nanoHUB, an innovative 
research community where users are ordered by amount of voluntarily provided content and 
locating the rankings requires several clicks on the webpage.
4
 Empirical studies have noted that 
online users tend to ignore information that takes time to find; for example, on eBay, buyers 
rarely click through to view detailed feedback information about sellers (Resnick et al., 2006).  
We find that contributions are significantly increased when contributors are recognized 
(i.e., photos and names of all contributors are displayed after the contribution stage) relative to 
when contributors are not identified. When viewing information about contributors is costly, 
there is no significant difference in contributions as compared to the case where all contributors 
are displayed by default. This effect holds even though the identities of contributors are viewed 
less than 10% of the time. We are also able to pinpoint which information is most effective at 
increasing contributions. Recognizing only the top contributors is not significantly different from 
not recognizing contributors. The most surprising result is that recognizing only the bottom 
contributors is as effective as recognizing all contributors.  
Overall, the results of our experiment provide guidelines for increasing contributions to 
public goods through changing display of information. The results are relevant for charity 
organizations, online communities, and policymakers. Our findings suggest that charity 
organizations and online communities should always post information about contributions, even 
when it is costly for others to view such information. The results also speak more broadly to 
policymakers. For example, increasing participation in socially desirable activities, such as 
                                                 
3
 Yahoo! Answers is one of the top sites on which one can find and share information. The “Leaderboard” can be 
found at http://answers.yahoo.com/rank_total;_ylt=AvhvsGIO6_Z9A.kmMNpASUrsy6IX;_ylv=3. The 
“Leaderboard” is only accessible by scrolling down to the bottom of the page, clicking on “About Yahoo! Answers”, 
again scrolling down to the bottom of the page and then clicking on “Leaderboard.” Further, gathering information 
about individual contributors requires scrolling through several pages of information. 
4
 The nanoHUB is designed to be a resource to the entire nanotechnology discovery and learning community: 
http://www.nanohub.org  
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voting or community service, could be achieved by publishing lists of community members who 
have and have not participated in such activities. 
 
2. Public Goods Game  
 
Some of the most fundamental questions about charity contributions have been answered 
using the public goods game setting in the experimental laboratory (Ledyard, 1995). In a simple 
linear public goods game (Groves and Ledyard, 1977),  identical risk-neutral players choose a 
portion of their endowments  to contribute to a public good. Player ’s contribution  to the 
public good is multiplied by an MPCR  and split between  players in the group. 
Thus, the payoff for player  is given by: . 
The standard Nash equilibrium prediction of this game is to contribute nothing  
(free-ride). However, previous experimental studies have found that subjects contribute 
significant amounts on average. There is also heterogeneity in contributions: while some subjects 
contribute their entire endowment, other subjects fully free-ride and contribute nothing (Ledyard, 
1995; Fehr and Gachter, 2000). Common arguments for why individuals contribute to public 
goods include altruism or “warm glow” (Andreoni, 1989, 1990; Ledyard, 1995) and social 
recognition theory (Glazer and Konrad, 1996). Social recognition concerns may encourage 
higher contributions only when contributions and identities of contributors are seen by others. 
Indeed, it has been shown that displaying information about individual contributions to public 
goods increases contribution levels (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Rege and Telle, 2004; Soetevent, 
2005). The current experiment builds on the design of Andreoni and Petrie (2004) by 
systematically varying the visibility of information in a public goods setting. 
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3. Experimental Design 
The experiment was conducted at the Vernon Smith Experimental Economics 
Laboratory. Volunteers were recruited from a pool of undergraduate students at Purdue 
University. A total of 200 subjects participated in 10 sessions, with 20 subjects participating in 
each session. All subjects participated in only one session of this study. Some subjects had 
participated in other economics experiments that were unrelated to this research.  
The computerized experimental sessions used z-Tree 3.3.6 (Fischbacher, 2007) to record 
subject decisions and display photos of subjects. We conducted 5 treatments, summarized in 
Table 1: a treatment in which contributors were not publicly recognized for their contributions 
(None-Free), a treatment in which only the highest contributors were recognized for their 
contributions (Top-Free), a treatment in which only the lowest contributors were recognized for 
their contributions (Bottom-Free), a treatment in which all contributors were recognized (All-
Free), and a treatment in which all contributors were recognized but this information was costly 
for others to view (All-Costly). 
Similar to the design of Andreoni and Petrie (2004), we chose to use digital photos to 
identify subjects to one another because digital photos capture and preserve the appearance of the 
person but do not allow for communication, which may confound the effects of identification 
alone. In addition to the photo, we also included first names written on the name card as part of 
the identification of subjects. Upon arriving at the lab, each subject wrote his or her first name on 
a name card, and the experimenter took a photo of the subject holding up the name card. Each 
subject was then randomly assigned to a computer station in the lab. 
Subjects were assigned to a group of 5 in which they stayed throughout the entire 
experiment, playing a public goods game for a total of 20 periods. At the beginning of each 
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period, subjects received an endowment of 80 experimental francs and were asked to choose 
their level of contribution to the public good. Each subject’s contribution to the public good was 
multiplied by MPCR = 0.4 and the total of all contributions given to each of the 5 subjects in the 
group. Each subject kept the remainder of the 80-franc endowment that he did not allocate to the 
public good. Subjects did not know others’ decisions before making their own decisions. After 
all subjects made their contributions, the computer displayed the total contribution to the group 
account and the individual contributions of all 5 group members, sorted from largest to smallest. 
The photos and names of each group member were displayed on the input screen for all 
subjects, but we varied the display of identifiable information about contributors on the outcome 
screen across treatments. In the None-Free treatment, no additional identifiable information 
about contributors was revealed. In the All-Free treatment, the names and photos of each 
member were displayed below his or her contribution, such that each individual was recognized 
and also “ranked” (see Figure 1). In the Top-Free treatment, the names and photos of only the 
top two contributors (those ranked #1 and #2) were displayed below their contributions. 
Similarly, in the Bottom-Free treatment, the names and photos of only the bottom two 
contributors (those ranked #4 and #5) were displayed below their contributions. Finally, in the 
All-Costly treatment, after making contribution decisions, and after viewing the default “None-
Free” screen with a list of individual contributions but no identification of contributors, subjects 
had the option to pay a small cost (3 experimental francs) to view the identifiable information 
about all contributors (as in the All-Free treatment) on the screen. Whether or not information 
was viewed was not disclosed to subjects during the experiment. 
At the end of the experiment, 2 out of 20 periods were selected for payment using a 
random draw from a bingo cage. Experimental francs were used throughout the experiment, with 
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a conversion rate of 20 francs = $1. Subjects earned $14 on average, and sessions (including 
instruction time) lasted approximately 60 minutes. Subjects also completed a demographic 
questionnaire at the end of each session. 
 
4. Experiment Results 
4.1. Overview 
The summary statistics are reported in Table 2 and the average contributions over all 20 
periods are displayed in Figure 2. Relative to theoretical predictions (  = 0), we find significant 
over-contribution in all treatments, with contributions declining over time.
5
 Note that as the 
result of over-contribution, subjects’ payoffs are significantly higher than the equilibrium 
prediction. Our finding of over-contribution is consistent with previous experimental studies, 
which report that over-contribution is common in public goods environments (Ledyard, 1995). 
The results from our baseline treatment None-Free are in line with previous work – we find 
contributions that are at 29.3% of the endowment over all periods. Andreoni (1988, 1995) 
reported overall contributions at 33.2% of the endowment, while Croson (1996) reported 
contributions at 35.7% of the endowment. 
Similar to Andreoni and Petrie (2004), we find that revealing the identities of contributors 
in the All-Free treatment significantly increases overall contributions relative to the None-Free 
treatment.
6
 Our baseline treatment None-Free is most similar to Andreoni and Petrie’s (2004) 
“Information” treatment. In our baseline, contributions are equal to 29.3% of the endowment, 
while Andreoni and Petrie (2004) find that contributions are at 26.9% of the endowment. The 
                                                 
5
 A t-test, comparing average contributions to 0, gives the p-values of less than 0.05 for all treatments. 
6
 A Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank-sum test shows that average contributions over all periods in the None-Free 
treatment are significantly lower than average contributions over all periods in the All-Free treatment (p-value < 
0.05). The same conclusion holds when looking at periods 6-20 (p-value < 0.05). 
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main difference between our treatment All-Free and Andreoni and Petrie’s (2004) “Information-
and-Photos” treatment is that we also include the first name of each individual. While Andreoni 
and Petrie (2004) find that the average percent contributed is 48.1% in “Information-and-
Photos,” we find that the average percent of endowment contributed is marginally higher, 
55.3%.
7
 
Result 1: Revealing identities of contributors significantly increases contributions. 
In practice, if the charity or online community wishes to display a list of all contributors, 
due to limited space this is often displayed in a location that takes time and effort to locate and 
read through. To investigate this issue, in treatment All-Costly, we impose a small cost on 
individuals who wish to view a list of the identities of all contributors. We do find a significant 
improvement in contributions in treatment All-Costly relative to treatment None-Free. Moreover, 
there is no significant difference in contributions between treatment All-Free and treatment All-
Costly.
8
 This result suggests that the current system in place on websites such as Yahoo! Answers 
and nanoHUB, where it takes time and effort to discover the rankings of contributors and where 
rankings are not viewed often, may not be different from a case where rankings are more visible 
in terms of increasing contributions. This finding highlights the importance of making identities 
of all contributions publicly available, even if this information is in a place that is difficult to 
find. 
                                                 
7
 We do not claim that this marginal increase in contribution levels is solely due to the addition of the first name 
component; as other experimental design aspects, for example, ranking the subjects, overall endowment, are also 
different across our experiment and the experiment of Andreoni and Petrie (2004). A clean test of whether the first 
name component increases contributions could be achieved by running another treatment of our experiment with the 
name removed; however, we chose not to do this as this is not the main question of our study. 
8
 A Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank-sum test shows that average contributions over all periods in the All-Costly 
treatment are not significantly different from average contributions in the All-Free treatment, but are significantly 
different from average contributions in the None-Free treatment (p-values 0.47 and 0.00, respectively). The same 
conclusion holds when we use only periods 6-20 (p-value < 0.05). 
10 
 
Result 2: Imposing a cost for viewing identifiable information about contributors does 
not have a significant effect on contributions as compared to the case when identifiable 
information is readily available.  
  In the All-Costly treatment, identities of contributors are viewed by group members less 
than 10% of the time.
9
 The finding that only some subjects are willing to pay a small cost to view 
a list of the contributors’ identities is in line with the recent finding of Eckel and Petrie (2010), 
who investigate the informational value of a photo in a trust game. Eckel and Petrie (2010) find 
that even at a very low price, only a fraction of subjects purchase the photos of their matches. 
However, in the experiment of Eckel and Petrie (2010) subjects purchase the photos before the 
game begins, while in our experiment subjects “purchase” the photos after each contribution 
decision is made.  
We also attempt to pinpoint which contributors must necessarily be recognized in order 
to raise contributions. In practice, organizations often rely on displaying only top contributors 
due to limited space. We find that displaying the identities of only top contributors, as in the 
Top-Free treatment, increases contributions only marginally, and not significantly different, 
relative to the baseline treatment None-Free (27.8 versus 23.4).
10
 This suggests that displaying 
only top contributors is not a particularly effective way to increase overall contributions to public 
goods. 
Result 3: Displaying the identity of only the top contributors increases contributions only 
marginally and this difference is not statistically significant. 
                                                 
9
 With 20 periods and 40 individuals in the All-Free treatment, the number of times photos are viewed is 74/800 
(9.2%). 
10
 A Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank-sum test shows that contributions are not significantly different between None-
Free and Top-Free treatments (p-value = 0.35). However, contributions are significantly different between All-Free 
and Top-Free (p-value < 0.05). 
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In a follow-up treatment, we display identities of only lowest contributors. While this is 
not often done in practice, the purpose of this treatment is to investigate whether it is the display 
of lowest contributors that drives our All-Free/All-Costly and Andreoni and Petrie’s (2004) 
results. In fact, we do find that displaying the identities of only lowest contributors, as in the 
Bottom-Free treatment, significantly increases contributions relative to both the None-Free and 
Top-Free treatments (44.9 versus 23.4 and 27.8). Moreover, contributions in the Bottom-Free 
treatment are similar to contributions in the All-Free treatment (44.9 versus 44.3).
11
 This 
suggests that recognizing only the bottom contributors is as effective as recognizing all 
contributors.
12
 
Result 4: Displaying the identity of only the bottom contributors significantly increases 
contributions relative to the case where no identities are displayed, and is as effective as 
displaying the identities of all contributors. 
 
4.2. Prestige or Shame 
While motivations such as altruism and “warm-glow” can explain contributions to public 
goods when identities are unknown, additional motivations arise when identities are revealed. 
Previous research has suggested that some individuals may contribute a large proportion of their 
endowment due to effects such as prestige, while other individuals may contribute a large 
proportion of their endowment due to effects such as shame from the guilt of contributing too 
                                                 
11
 A Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank-sum test shows that contributions in the Bottom-Free treatment are significantly 
higher than in the None-Free and Top-Free treatments (both p-values < 0.05). However, contributions are not 
different between the Bottom-Free and All-Free treatments (p-value = 0.60). 
12
 Kurzban and Descoli (2008) report an experiment in which participants could access information about the lowest, 
median, or highest contribution to the public good before making their own contribution decisions. The authors find 
that subjects are willing to purchase information on previous-round behavior at a small cost, with reciprocators 
purchasing information about the median contribution and free-riders purchasing information about the highest 
contribution. Furthermore, adding a cost to view information decreased aggregate contributions. 
12 
 
little, and that these effects may be amplified when actions are publicly known (Nathanson, 
1987; Broucek, 1991; Harbaugh, 1998; Soetevent, 2005). The impact of social pressure has also 
been documented in the context of voting (Funk, 2010).  We conjecture that when all identities 
are revealed (All-Free), the prestige effect should increase the proportion of high contributors, 
while the presence of guilt should decrease the proportion of low contributors relative to the 
baseline (None-Free). When individuals have the option of viewing identities (All-Costly), the 
prestige and shame effects should not be as strong; therefore, the proportion of high contributors 
should fall and the proportion of low contributors should increase (relative to All-Free).  
In the Top-Free treatment, high contributors are always revealed, but low contributors are 
never revealed, so high contributions should primarily be driven by prestige. In the Bottom-Free 
treatment, low contributors are always revealed but high contributors are never revealed, so high 
contributions should primarily be driven by shame. Because contributions in Top-Free are not 
statistically significantly different from None-Free, but contributions in Bottom-Free are 
statistically significantly greater than in None-Free, we conjecture that the effect from 
identifying contributors may be primarily driven by effects such as shame, rather than by effects 
such as prestige.
13
 
In addition to the “shame” conjecture, another potential explanation for the finding that 
contributions are increased when only low contributors are identified is that displaying only the 
bottom contributors serves as an exogenous punishment mechanism for low contributors. It has 
been shown in the literature that social disapproval (either monetary or non-monetary) is a very 
powerful mechanism that improves individual contributions to public goods (Fehr and Gaechter, 
                                                 
13
 This result is in line with results of a voting field experiment in which citizens either viewed lists of registered 
voters or non-voters (Panagopoulos, 2001). This result is supported by theoretical work suggesting that guilt or 
shame may be a greater motivating factor than altruism or warm-glow (Tadelis, 2007). 
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2000, 2002; Masclet et al., 2003). Therefore, subjects trying to avoid social disapproval should 
contribute sufficient amounts in order to avoid being the lowest contributors.  
 
4.3. Leaders and Laggards 
Similar to Andreoni and Petrie (2004) and Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2001), we investigate 
the presence of leaders and laggards in our experiment; that is, do we have “leaders” who set an 
example by contributing a lot, or “laggards” who contribute little? We use a simple classification 
system to discover “leaders” and “laggards,” where a leader is defined as any individual who 
contributed 60 or more experimental francs (75% of the endowment) and a laggard is defined as 
any individual contributed 20 or less experimental francs (25% of the endowment) in the first 
period.
14
  The remainder subjects are classified as followers.  
We conjecture that All-Free and All-Costly should increase leaders and decrease laggards 
relative to None-Free. In the Top-Free treatment, leaders are more likely to be revealed while 
laggards are less likely to be revealed, so we conjecture that the proportion of leaders should be 
increased but the proportion of laggards should not change relative to None-Free. In the Bottom-
Free treatment, leaders are less likely to be revealed while laggards are more likely to be 
revealed, so we conjecture that the proportion of leaders should not change while the proportion 
of laggards should decrease relative to None-Free. 
Table 3 shows the distribution of leaders and laggards as a percentage of total number of 
subjects. Comparing treatment None-Free with All-Free, we find that in treatment All-Free there 
are almost twice as many leaders (52.5% versus 30.0%), and almost four times fewer laggards 
                                                 
14
 Andreoni and Petrie (2004) use a similar approach of classifying leaders who contributed 15 or more tokens out of 
20 and as laggards as those who contributed 5 or fewer tokens out of 20. However, the difference is that we use only 
one set of 20 periods while in Andreoni and Petrie (2004), subjects complete 5 sequences of contributions with 
different group members. In that case, they use the measure for “leaders” as those who contributed 15 or more in 4 
out of 5 sequences, and as “laggards” as those who contributed 5 or fewer tokens in 4 out of 5 sequences. 
14 
 
(10.0% versus 35.0%), and these differences are significant.
15
 Adding a cost of viewing 
information does not significantly reduce the number of leaders in the All-Costly relative to the 
All-Free treatment, but it more than doubles the number of laggards.
16
 
If individuals care about prestige of being displayed as one of the top two contributors, 
we should expect to see a greater number of leaders in the Top-Free relative to the None-Free 
treatment. However, we do not find this in the data. The proportion of leaders in both treatments 
is the same.
17
 Moreover, Figure 3, which displays the distribution of contributions in all 
treatments, indicates that there are almost no differences in distributions between treatments 
None-Free and Top-Free. This finding further supports our earlier conjecture that prestige is not 
the primary factor that causes higher contributions from identifying contributors. 
If individuals are concerned about feeling guilty by being displayed as one of the bottom 
two contributors, we should expect to see a lower number of laggards in the Bottom-Free relative 
to the None-Free treatment. This is exactly what our data indicate. There are significantly fewer 
laggards in the Bottom-Free than in the None-Free treatment (17.5% versus 35.0%).
18
 Similar 
conclusions can be drawn by comparing aggregate distribution of contributions (Figure 3). This 
finding, therefore, further supports our earlier supposition that the primary factor that causes 
higher contributions from identifying contributors is shame.
19
 
                                                 
15
 A Chi^2 goodness of fit test has a p-value of 0.04 when comparing leaders, and a p-value of 0.01 when comparing 
laggards.  
16
 A Chi^2 goodness of fit test has a p-value of 0.66 when comparing leaders and p-value of 0.05 when comparing 
laggards. 
17
 Interestingly, there are more laggards in the Top-Free treatment even compared to the None-Free treatment. This 
may be because highlighting only the top contributors implicitly emphasizes that the rest of subjects are laggards 
and thus they should not contribute as much. It is also possible that highlighting only top contributors may implicitly 
de-emphasize the guilt effect, and thus cause more laggards in the Top-Free treatment relative to the None-Free 
treatment. 
18
 A Chi^2 goodness of fit test has a p-value of 0.08 when comparing laggards. 
19
 The proportion of leaders and laggards in the Bottom-Free is not significantly different from the All-Free (p-
values are 0.37 and 0.33). 
15 
 
It is also interesting to note that there are more leaders in the Bottom-Free than in the 
None-Free treatment (42.5% versus 30.0%).
20
 It is likely that subjects who are trying to avoid 
guilt and shame of social disapproval (Masclet et al., 2003) are doing so by contributing very 
substantial amounts, which brings them into the category of leaders. This provides additional 
evidence on how effective non-monetary incentives are in encouraging higher contributions to 
public goods. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
The results of our experiment replicate previous findings that revealing identities of 
contributors significantly increases overall contributions. We also find that recognizing only the 
top contributors is not significantly different from not recognizing contributors, while 
recognizing only the bottom contributors is as effective as recognizing all contributors. We also 
find that imposing a cost for viewing identifiable information about contributors does not have a 
significant effect on contributions as compared to the case when identifiable information is 
publicly available. These results provide practical guidelines for increasing contributions to 
public goods through changing display of information. The findings speak broadly both to 
charity organizations and online communities, and also to policymakers.  
The findings of our experiment have practical applications to online communities, who, 
similar to charity organizations, can increase contributions through publicly acknowledging 
members. In online communities and forums, “contributions” usually take the form of user-
provided content, which is often necessary to ensure the success of the community. Recognizing 
contributors is often done by online communities through publicly available rankings with lists 
                                                 
20
 This difference is not significant, however. A Chi^2 goodness of fit test has a p-value of 0.25 when comparing 
leaders. 
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of all contributors or through publicly recognizing only top contributors. There are a number of 
research studies investigating contributions to various online communities and forums (Rafaeli et 
al., 2004; Harper et al., 2007; Yang et al., 2008; Adler et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2010; Rana and 
Hinze, 2004; Farooq et al., 2007; Ludford et al., 2004).
21
  We contribute to this literature by 
providing concrete suggestions for the display and visibility of identifiable contributor 
information. 
The results of our experiment suggest that displaying information about the identities of 
all contributors, even if this information is not readily available and takes effort to discover, is a 
very effective way to increase contributions. In fact, the increase in contributions from utilizing 
this method to recognize contributors is not significantly different from the case in which 
information about all contributors is readily available and costless to view. On the other hand, 
the improvement resulting from recognizing only top contributors relative to not recognizing any 
contributor is only marginal and statistically insignificant. Therefore, the designers of online 
communities should display all contributor rankings rather than only top rankings. 
Because shame appears to be a powerful motivator to contribute, one may ask the 
question:  why don’t charities and online communities practice displaying only bottom 
contributors?  While charities and online communities face the problem of increasing 
contributions, they also face the first-order problem of attracting and retaining participants. 
Given the opportunity of free entry and exit, individuals may simply avoid participating in 
                                                 
21
 Separate bodies of work exist on contributions to question and answer sites such as Yahoo! Answers or Google 
Answers (Rafaeli et al., 2007; Harper et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2010), contributions involving greater effort and 
expertise to sites such as Taskcn or SourceForge (Yang et al., 2008; Adler et al., 2008; Chaterjee and Pye, 2008), 
review posting on sites such as Amazon, eBay or MovieLens (Savikhin, 2009; Chen et al., 2010), and use of 
collaborative online communities to encourage relationships (Rana and Hinze, 2004; Farooq et al., 2007).  
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charities and online communities that only display bottom contributors. Displaying all 
contributor information may be an indirect way that such organizations address this issue.  
The results can also provide guidelines to increase socially desirable participation and 
contribution within organizations or communities when entry and exit is more costly. For 
example, voting in elections is a socially desirable activity whereby citizens must expend time 
and effort to vote, but all community members benefit from high voter turnout. Policies that 
prescribe publicizing lists of registered voters who have or have not cast a vote may be an 
effective approach for increasing voter turnout. 
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Tables and Figures  
 
 
Table 1: Summary of Treatments 
Treatment 
Display of 
Identities 
Cost of 
Information 
Number of 
Subjects 
None-Free None Free 40 
All-Free All players Free 40 
Top-Free Top 2 players Free 40 
Bottom-Free Bottom 2 players Free 40 
All-Costly All players Costly 40 
 
 
Table 2: Average Statistics 
Treatment 
Average 
Contribution 
Contribution as 
% of Endowment 
% of Contributions 
= 0 
% of Contributions 
= Endowment 
None-Free 23.4 (0.9) 29.3% 34.4% 8.3% 
All-Free 44.2 (1.2) 55.3% 22.0% 32.8% 
Top-Free 27.8 (1.0) 34.8% 24.4% 10.9% 
 
0 
Bottom-Free 44.9 (1.0) 56.1% 12.4% 25.1% 
All-Costly 39.3 (1.2) 49.1% 33.6% 32.8% 
Standard error of the mean in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 3: Distribution of Leaders and Laggards 
 None-Free All-Free Top-Free Bottom-Free All-Costly 
Leaders 30.0% 52.5% 30.0% 42.5% 47.5% 
Laggards 35.0% 10.0% 32.5% 17.5% 27.5% 
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Figure 1: Output Screens (Names and Photos are Removed) 
Treatment All-Free 
 
Treatment Top-Free 
 
Treatment None-Free 
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Figure 2: Average Contribution as Percentage of the Endowment over 20 Periods
 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of Contributions over 20 Periods
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Appendix: Instructions for AC Treatment 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
In this experiment you will be placed in a group of 5 participants (including you). You will remain in the 
same group for the entire experiment. The experiment will consist of 20 periods. At the end of the experiment 2 out 
of 20 periods will be randomly selected for payment. After you have completed all periods two tokens will be 
randomly drawn out of a bingo cage containing tokens numbered from 1 to 20. The token numbers determine which 
two periods are going to be paid in the game. 
Each period you will be given 80 francs. Francs will be converted to U.S. dollars at the end of the 
experiment at the rate of 20 francs = $1. Each period you will be asked to decide how many francs you want to 
allocate to a Group Account. You may allocate any integer number of francs between 0 and 80. The remainder will 
be automatically allocated to your Individual Account.  
 
 
EARNINGS 
After all participants have made their decisions, your earnings for the period are calculated. These earnings 
will be converted to cash and paid at the end of the experiment if the current period is the period that is randomly 
chosen for payment. Your earnings consist of two parts: 
1) Your earnings from the Individual Account  
2) Your earnings from the Group Account  
Your earnings from the Individual Account equal to the francs that you keep for yourself and do not depend 
on the decisions of others. Therefore, for every franc you keep for yourself in your Individual Account, you earn 1 
franc. 
Your earnings from the Group Account depend on the total number of francs allocated to the Group 
Account by all 5 group members (including you). In particular, your earnings from the Group Account are 40 
percent of the total allocation of all 5 group members (including you) to the Group Account. Therefore, for every 
franc you allocate to the Group Account, you increase the total allocation to the Group Account by 1 franc. 
Therefore, your earnings from the Group Account rise by 0.4×1=0.4 francs. And the earnings of the other group 
members also rise by 0.4 francs each, so that the total earnings of the group from the Group Account rise by 2.4 
francs. 
In summary, your period earnings are determined as follows: 
Your earnings = earnings from the Individual Account + earnings from the Group Account =  
= 80 - (your allocation to the Group Account) + 0.4×(allocation of 5 group members to the Group Account) 
 
Example: Suppose that you allocated 40 francs to the Group Account and that the other four members of 
your group allocated a total of 120 francs. This makes a total of 160 francs in the Group Account. In this case each 
member of the group receives earnings from the Group Account of 0.4×160 = 64 francs. In addition, you also 
receive 40 francs from your Individual Account since you have kept 40 francs to your Individual Account. 
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OUTCOME SCREEN 
At the end of each period, your allocation and the sum of all allocations in your group are reported on the 
outcome screen as shown below. To aid you in your calculation, you are also shown your earnings from your 
individual account and your earnings from the group account. Once the outcome screen is displayed you should 
record your results for the period on your Personal Record Sheet under the appropriate heading. 
The photos and names of each member of your group will be displayed on the top of your screen at all 
times. At the end of each period, the photos of all group members will be re-arranged by the number of francs 
allocated to the Group Account in that period.  
The allocations will be ranked from highest allocation to lowest allocation, and the amount of each group 
member's allocation will be listed on the screen.  
RANKING 
Further, each member in the group will be given a ranking, corresponding to the number of tokens 
allocated in that period within the group. For example, the member with the highest allocation in the group will be 
given the ranking of #1, the group member with the second-highest allocation will be given the ranking of #2, and so 
on. You have the choice to see the ranking of each group member as well as your own ranking. If you choose to 
view the rankings, click on “yes” for the question “Would you like to view the rankings?” If you choose to view the 
rankings, you will pay 3 experimental dollars, which will be subtracted from your outcome in each period, and the 
photo and name of each group member will be listed below his or her ranking on the screen. If you choose not to 
view the rankings, click on “no” for the question “Would you like to view the rankings?” If you do not view the 
rankings, you will not pay 3 experimental dollars. 
 
 
 
Economic Science Institute Working Papers 
2010 
10-19 Sheremeta, R. and Shields, T. Do Investors Trust or Simply Gamble? 
10-18 Deck, C.  and Sheremeta, R. Fight or Flight? Defending Against Sequential Attacks in the Game of 
Siege. 
10-17 Deck, C., Lin, S. and Porter, D. Affecting Policy by Manipulating Prediction Markets:  
Experimental Evidence.  
10-16 Deck, C. and Kimbrough, E. Can Markets Save Lives? An Experimental Investigation of a Market 
for Organ Donations. 
10-15 Deck, C., Lee, J. and Reyes, J. Personality and the Consistency of Risk Taking Behavior:  
Experimental Evidence.   
10-14 Deck, C. and Nikiforakis, N. Perfect and Imperfect Real-Time Monitoring in a Minimum-Effort 
Game.   
10-13 Deck, C. and Gu, J. Price Increasing Competition? Experimental Evidence. 
10-12 Kovenock, D., Roberson, B.,and Sheremeta, R. The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link 
Networks. 
10-11 Wilson, B., Jaworski, T., Schurter, K. and  Smyth, A. An Experimental Economic History of 
Whalers’ Rules of Capture.  
10-10 DeScioli, P. and Wilson, B. Mine and Thine: The Territorial Foundations of Human Property. 
10-09 Cason, T., Masters, W. and Sheremeta, R. Entry into Winner-Take-All and Proportional-Prize 
Contests: An Experimental Study. 
10-08 Savikhin, A. and Sheremeta, R. Simultaneous Decision-Making in Competitive and Cooperative 
Environments. 
10-07 Chowdhury, S. and Sheremeta, R. A generalized Tullock contest. 
  
10-06 Chowdhury, S. and Sheremeta, R. The Equivalence of Contests. 
  
10-05 Shields, T. Do Analysts Tell the Truth? Do Shareholders Listen? An Experimental Study of 
Analysts' Forecasts and Shareholder Reaction. 
  
10-04 Lin, S. and Rassenti, S. Are Under- and Over-reaction the Same Matter? A Price Inertia based 
Account. 
  
10-03 Lin, S. Gradual Information Diffusion and Asset Price Momentum. 
  
10-02 Gjerstad, S. and Smith, V. Household expenditure cycles and economic cycles, 1920 – 2010. 
  
10-01 Dickhaut, J., Lin, S., Porter, D. and Smith, V. Durability, Re-trading and Market Performance.  
2009 
09-11 Hazlett, T., Porter, D., Smith, V. Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity OF Ronald Coase. 
  
09-10 Sheremeta, R. Expenditures and Information Disclosure in Two-Stage Political Contests. 
  
09-09 Sheremeta, R. and Zhang, J. Can Groups Solve the Problem of Over-Bidding in Contests? 
  
09-08 Sheremeta, R. and Zhang, J. Multi-Level Trust Game with "Insider" Communication. 
  
09-07 Price, C. and Sheremeta, R. Endowment Effects in Contests.  
  
09-06 Cason, T., Savikhin, A. and Sheremeta, R. Cooperation Spillovers in Coordination Games. 
  
09-05 Sheremeta, R. Contest Design: An Experimental Investigation.  
  
09-04 Sheremeta, R. Experimental Comparison of Multi-Stage and One-Stage Contests. 
  
09-03 Smith, A., Skarbek, D., and Wilson, B. Anarchy, Groups, and Conflict: An Experiment on the 
Emergence of Protective Associations. 
09-02 Jaworski, T. and Wilson, B. Go West Young Man: Self-selection and Endogenous Property Rights. 
09-01 Gjerstad, S. Housing Market Price Tier Movements in an Expansion and Collapse. 
2008  
08-10 Dickhaut, J., Houser, D., Aimone, J., Tila, D. and Johnson, C. High Stakes Behavior with Low 
Payoffs: Inducing Preferences with Holt-Laury Gambles.  
08-09 Stecher, J., Shields, T. and Dickhaut, J. Generating Ambiguity in the Laboratory.  
08-08 Stecher, J., Lunawat, R., Pronin, K. and Dickhaut, J. Decision Making and Trade without 
Probabilities.   
08-07 Dickhaut, J., Lungu, O., Smith, V., Xin, B. and Rustichini, A. A Neuronal Mechanism of Choice. 
08-06 Anctil, R., Dickhaut, J., Johnson, K., and Kanodia, C. Does Information Transparency 
Decrease Coordination Failure? 
08-05 Tila, D. and Porter, D. Group Prediction in Information Markets With and Without Trading 
Information and Price Manipulation Incentives.  
08-04 Caginalp, G., Hao, L., Porter, D. and Smith, V. Asset Market Reactions to News: An Experimental 
Study.  
08-03 Thomas, C. and Wilson, B. Horizontal Product Differentiation in Auctions and Multilateral 
Negotiations.  
08-02 Oprea, R., Wilson, B. and Zillante, A. War of Attrition: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment on 
Market Exit.  
08-01 Oprea, R., Porter, D., Hibbert, C., Hanson, R. and Tila, D. Can Manipulators Mislead Prediction 
Market Observers? 
